Laura’s Philosophy
Laura Wolf
Abridged Ethical Theories Thesis
The University of Texas at Austin
Authenticity as the Chief Existential Virtue
I argue that “authenticity” towards oneself, others, and the external world ought to be regarded as the key to yielding a fulfilling, well-lived, ethical life. However, a proper understanding of what authenticity means, implies and stipulates must be conceived of in an existential sense. First, Jean-Paul Sartre, a twentieth century French philosopher, and his insistence on an existential morality of avoiding “bad faith” must be attended to. Second, I examine Martin Heidegger, a twentieth century existential, German philosopher, and his specific descriptions, symptoms, and examples of inauthentic vs. authentic action. Third, after having analyzed and synthesized the aforementioned existential thinkers’ positions, I will defend and describe my own definition of authenticity as, “an attitude of resoluteness, passion, genuineness, and individualism with knowledge of realistic opportunities and limitations in life.” Finally, I will evaluate a false positive to my definition, answering this significant objection utilizing the philosophical reasoning of the existentialists. Thus, I will have illustrated that authenticity, in itself, ought to be regarded as the key, enabling factor to a satisfying, moral life.
Jean-Paul Sartre is most noted for his emphasis on the freedom and responsibility of each individual being. Sartre argues that the first principle of existentialism is that, in effect, a person amounts to what he wills into action and what he makes of himself, as Sartre says, “What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards” (Existentialism is a Humanism, 207). Thus, man first comes into being, i.e. “existence,” and then embraces his ability to “define himself;” i.e. to define his “essences,” the objective, qualitative facets of someone or something. As a result of man’s ability to determine his own purpose, direction, goals, and characteristics of himself, i.e. the ability to “transcend”, Sartre claims that man is entirely accountable for the results of his actions. For example, if one constantly practices piano, one will become a skilled pianist; conversely, if one chooses to never study piano, then he is accountable for never becoming a pianist. Transcendence is authentic precisely because each person has both freedom and absolute responsibility for what he does, who he becomes, etc.; thus, if one determines his fate for himself, he is acting authentically. Furthermore, Sartre claims that one is also at the helm of humanity’s values due to the fact that individual actions contribute to societal customs and norms, which influence others to act in a certain manner. He suggests, “the first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders. And, when we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men. . . in choosing for himself he chooses for all men” (Existentialism is a Humanism, 208). In this way, Sartre calls on individuals to make conscious choices to act on ethical modes of conduct that are good for all to abide by, thereby rendering a subjective, existential moral code that is beneficial to humanity. When each person makes a subjective moral decision, he is effectively affirming or denying the value of that act. For example, if one chooses to steal, one is saying that it behooves all men to steal; thus, we ought to think about the universal implications of our individual actions and consider whether the value they support is beneficial or detrimental for everyone to follow.
Despite his insistence on the freedom of each person, Sartre, through his concept of “facticity,” acknowledges certain constraints on human freedom that are beyond the control of individuals; he states, “I am not ‘free’ to escape the lot of my class, of my nation, of my family, or even to build up my own power or fortune. . . . man seems ‘to be made’ by climate and the earth, race and class, language, the history of the collectivity of which he is a part, heredity, the individual circumstances of his childhood…” (Freedom and Facticity: The Situation, 239-40). Thus, the freedom that Sartre stresses amounts to the individual’s will, i.e. the autonomy of choice, not the ability to attain any potential outcome one desires because certain factors, i.e. one’s class, nation, family, etc., inhibit certain actions. For example, one who is not born in the United States can never become president. However, one must not neglect his capacity for transcendence; failing to do so puts one in an inauthentic state, which Sartre deems “bad faith.” Bad faith is typically characterized by either a denial of one’s “transcendence” or “facticity,” but Sartre focuses on the former case (Being and Nothingness, 86-95).
Martin Heidegger, unlike the former two philosophers, created his own terminology to discuss existential topics (i.e. individuals, other people, living in the world, etc.) in order to avoid ontological prejudices attached to words we use ordinarily (i.e. the self, others, the world, etc.); a prescribed way of understanding such terms is inherently embedded in our minds by our past experiences and societal norms, which causes distorted perception and biased views when reflecting on humankind. Thus, Heidegger begins his existential investigation by proposing that each individual who contemplates the phenomenon of being is considered a “Dasein,” as he states, “there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its being . . . . Understanding of being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein” (Heidegger, 32). Another significant characteristic of Dasein is its inherent immersion in the world, which Heidegger deems “being-in-the-world.” The notion is that every individual is constantly absorbed and engaged in the world, as a facet of their being; Dasein understands his own being in terms the “world” (i.e. the situation) he is born into and of the existence of other entities, i.e. other people and things (Heidegger, 33). Thus, Dasein’s existence cannot be understood separately from other people due to the shared environment and influences that each Dasein experiences in society, as Heidegger articulates, “this ‘with’ is something of the character of Dasein; the ‘too’ means a sameness of Being . . . By reason of this with-like Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is Being-with-Others” (155).
A major consequence of this “with-like Being-in-the-world” is that Dasein experiences a sense of being “thrown” into a certain family, nation, class, ethnicity, political situation, etc. The term “thrownness” describes a dizzying state of mind in which Dasein perceives the weight of unpredictable, uncontrollable, determinant features of its being (i.e. the elements of Dasein’s facticity) (Heidegger, 174-175). Furthermore, the result of this sense of being “thrown” leads Dasein to be immersed in and conform to the general rules of collective society. Heidegger dubs the collection of other people in society “the They” when he argues, “In the face of thrownness, Dasein flees to the relief which comes with the supposed freedom of they they-self” (321). Heidegger carefully uses the phrase “supposed freedom” to emphasize the inauthenticity of the They due to their falling prey to “everydayness;” the They fails to seize opportunities as individual Dasein and act in accordance with the groups’ mentality, thereby failing to take hold of their lives for themselves.
As a result, the inauthenticity of the They manifests itself in three ways: distantiality, averageness, and inauthentic-being-toward-death. First, “distantiality” is the term Heidegger uses to explain the sense of not knowing how to act or what to do in the world. Individuals look around at others and assume they “know what they’re doing,” when they may not (Heidegger 163-4). For example, a freshman in college navigating campus for the first time tries to seem cool and collected so that he appears to be like others (the “They”) who look as though they “know” what’s going on. This creates a tendency of Dasein to act in accordance with the They due to the paranoia from insecurity about how one “ought” to regularly behave. Thus, acting with the They squanders Dasein’s individuality; it’s as though he is not the genuine agent of his actions, as he is merely taking cues from others. As a result of distantiality, Dasein is sucked into the inauthentic everydayness of the They, as Heidegger illustrates, “We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as they see and judge . . . the They, which is nothing definite, and which all are, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness” (164). Second, “averageness” describes the They’s ability to dictate what is considered “proper” in society. This results in a “leveling down” of Dasein’s full potential and opportunities due to the social restrictions, set by the They, on what can be respectfully accomplished; thus, the They inadvertently dictate Dasein’s actions (Heidegger 164-5). Third, Heidegger argues that the They approaches “being-toward-death,” i.e. Dasein’s contemplation of the possibility of its own death, in an inauthentic manner. Their inauthenticity manifests itself in several ways: attempting to “externalize” death (i.e. “it won’t happen to me”), demanding that society assume a superior attitude toward death, reassuring the dying that they will survive, and even avoiding the topic entirely because it is seen as “socially inconvenient” to discuss or consider Dasein’s finite nature (Heidegger 296-8). These tendencies of the They stem from a desire to avoid confronting and accepting death, an example of falling prey to the “everydayness” of the They; just as Heidegger articulates, “But temptation, tranquilization, and alienation are distinguishing marks of the king of Being called ‘falling.’ As falling, everyday Being-towards-death is a constant fleeing in the face of death” (298).
Therefore, as opposed to “fleeing,” Dasein ought to respond authentically by coming to appreciate the possibility of his non-existence and live life in a way that is fulfilling in the face of the inevitability of death, thereby reconciling and coming to terms with mortality. Following from the initial realization of one’s own mortality, Dasein confronts the fact that he will die one day and is prompted to engage with life genuinely because he knows his days are numbered, and doing so leads Dasein to recognize the inauthenticity of the They in their insincere orientation toward death. Thus, a new, realized, authentic Dasein will approach the world with genuine, resolute being-toward-death. In this state, Dasein appreciates the inherent value of his life, explores his meaning in the world in spite of death, and chooses to relate to the world in a sincere way during the finite years of his life. This authentic “being-toward-death” is Heidegger’s primary alternative to the inauthentic mode of the They, shaking Dasein out of falling prey to the artificial “everydayness” of the They. To wit, “We may now summarize our characterization of authentic Being-towards-death: anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself. . . in an impassioned freedom towards death – a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the ‘they’” (Heidegger, 311).
To make the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity more clear, Heidegger provides three examples of both actions. First, he differentiates between idle talk, an inauthentic act, and disclosure, the authentic alternative. Idle talk is the authorless voice of the They; the individual is merely a placeholder, reading lines without genuinely interacting with the other person in the conversation. For example, “I’m sorry for your loss” is the They utilizing idle talk to promote inauthentic being-toward-death. On the other hand, “disclosure” is authentic in that it is a substantive conversation with the genuine opinions of Dasein formulated and articulated for himself (Falling Prey and Thrownness, 128-131). Second, “curiosity” is characterized as inauthentic in opposition to “understanding,” the conversely authentic act. “Curiosity” is a cursory attempt to gather information for idle talk. An example of such an act would be merely looking at headlines in the newspaper without absorbing the reasons or significance behind the event. Curiosity about a topic doesn’t extend beyond the “idle talk” of it. No active learning takes places, and one does not acquire knowledge; one merely follows the information in a vague, detached way without genuine interest. Another example of viewing something curiously is watching a car crash; one simply watches the dramatic events unfold without weighing the devastating reality of the event. Conversely, “understanding” ought to be employed in order to glean authentic understanding. Understanding seeks a true comprehension of various topics and finds meaning therein. When one understands, one contemplates the nature of being with true interest and motivation, asking existential questions and yielding genuine knowledge (Falling Prey and Thrownness, 130-131). Third, Heidegger articulates the inauthenticity of “ambiguity” and the authenticity of “attunement.” Ambiguity is a state in which one is aware that possibilities are at hand but does not truly consider their potential. One ambiguously manipulates the variables of life in a playful way for pleasure, not in a serious manner of contemplating potential outcomes; one reflects without true consideration. Thus, one’s facticity and what those facts mean for Dasein are ignored; in this way, ambiguity denies Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Due to the fact that being-in-the-world is an inherent characteristic of Dasein, ambiguity, by denying a defining feature of Dasein, is inauthentic self-denial. In order to embrace being-in-the-world, Dasein must act with “attunement,” manipulating the variables of life in a way that yields greater understanding of the experience of existence, the goal of existentialism (Falling Prey and Thrownness, 129-132). For example, an attuned state is akin to the tuning of an instrument; one adjusts the instrument’s variables to realize the full possibility of the instrument, i.e. producing a pleasing sound. Similarly, one maneuvers the factors of his life in order to understand and achieve one’s full potential.
In light of the philosophies of Sartre and Heidegger, I define authenticity as: “an attitude of resoluteness, passion, genuineness, and individualism with knowledge of realistic opportunities and limitations in life.” To illustrate how I constructed this definition, I will synthesize and summarize the aforementioned philosophers’ positions and their exact relevance to my definition of authenticity. First, Sartre gives validity to “resoluteness,” “individualism,” and “genuineness” in arguing that each individual ought to act on maxims that one believes is good for all. Sartre’s suggestion acknowledges the freedom (i.e. transcendence) and resultant responsibility of each person to develop and act on their own morality; this sense of duty causes one to be “resolute” in developing an ethical code of conduct, in a “genuine” way, that is beneficial for mankind to abide by. Additionally, Sartre’s notions of transcendence and facticity explain my claim that authenticity requires “knowledge of realistic opportunities and limitations in life.” That is, in order to be authentic, one must recognize the inherent, constraining facets of his situation in life while taking care to seize options that are available to him; thus, the authentic person will neither try to achieve the impossible nor ignore the opportunities within his existence. Second, Heidegger’s insistence on authentic being-toward-death is “resolute,” “passionate,” “genuine” and “individualistic” because one makes a concerted effort (i.e. a resolute effort) to come to terms with his finite being (i.e. a genuine acceptance) and make his life meaningful by finding significance and value in the world – a passionate, individualistic endeavor that each person must embark upon.
In order to avoid being too narrow, too broad, or unclear, my definition combines a behavior (i.e. an attitude of resoluteness, passion, genuineness, and individualism) with a mental state (i.e. knowledge of realistic opportunities and limitations in life). However, one significant objection arises as a “false positive” to my definition, i.e. a case that is “authentic” under my definition but ought not be considered truly authentic. This “false positive” objection is the following: a case in which an attitude of resoluteness, passion, genuineness, and individualism with knowledge of realistic opportunities and limitations in life is directed at harming another person. In response, I argue that a genuine, passionate, individualistic attitude leads one to recognize that all people are individuals; thus, each individual ought to be treated morally as an individual morally treats himself, i.e. both are individuals. Sartre’s claim that each person is infinitely free and responsible in “choosing for all humanity” supports the fact that individuals must act upon ethical guidelines that, if abided by all, facilitate positive, universal outcomes. This qualification demands that each person consider and weigh the universal implications of their actions. In weighing implications, one recognizes that the sanctity of life must be respected; just as one values, respects, and appreciates his own well being, one must also recognize these traits in others, as they are inherent facets of everyone’s humanity. For example, an authentic existential would not rob and murder a shopkeeper, as universally condoning this act results in values that are detrimental to mankind. If everyone were to do such a thing, the economy would fall out of balance, people would not trust one another, a sense of safety would be lost, etc. In addition to Sartre’s reasoning, I also argue that Heidegger’s qualifications for authentic being-toward-death prevent the possibility of evil in the ethics of authenticity. As I said, the confrontation with mortality leads one to appreciate the value of his life and explore his meaning in the world. However, a consequence of this is valuing the lives of others, as well. As Dasein is “being-with-others,” Dasein is inextricably linked to the They. Despite the They’s inauthentic nature, Dasein has the ability to rise above their inauthentic modes and relate to life in a genuine way (via the confrontation with death). Thus, the recognition of one’s own value, as Dasein, translates to recognition of the value of all people, as individual Dasein (not as the collective of the They). Thus, once again, the individual valuing his own existence leads to the recognition and respect of the value of others’ lives, thereby resolving the possibility of an authentic, ethical person committing malicious acts. Therefore, authenticity and its ability to yield an existential, fulfilling morality have been fully explicated, and the primary objection has been answered.
Works Cited
Heidegger, Martin. Falling Prey and Thrownness. Existentialism. Comp. Robert Solomon. New York: Oxford UP, 2005. Print.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962. Print.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. New York: Pocket, 1956. Print.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism Is a Humanism. Existentialism. Comp. Robert Solomon. New York: Oxford UP, 2005. Print.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Freedom and Facticity: The Situation. Existentialism. Comp. Robert Solomon. New York: Oxford UP, 2005. Print.